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Using economic incentives to attract new businesses
isn’t as simple as it may seem
The Baiting Game The Baiting GameC
ritics of economic develop-
ment incentives ranted and
raved in 1992 when South Car-
olina put together a $130 million
package to persuade BMW to build a
plant in Spartanburg County.
In the decade that followed, BMW
silenced those critics by building a
world-class facility and expanding it
several times. The company’s initial
employment estimate was 1,900. But
by 2001, the plant was providing jobs
to more than 4,300 people and an
annual economic impact estimated at
$4.1 billion, according to a study by the
Moore School of Business at the Uni-
versity of South Carolina.
The BMW incentives “turned out
to be chicken feed given the economic
impact of the plant,” says Ray Owens,
a vice president and senior economist
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Rich-
mond. Unfortunately, “for every BMW,
there are plenty of broken promises.”
Even when economic development
incentives are highly profitable for one
state, offering them is bad public policy
for the country as a whole, says Art
Rolnick, director of research for the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
“You are misallocating resources. You are
interfering with interstate commerce. It
is economically inefficient,” he says. “And
sometimes you induce a company to take
a second-best location.”
Rolnick views incentives as a “nega-
tive-sum” baiting game that should be
outlawed by Congress because it pits
states against each other at the expense
of the national economy. For every
winner there is a loser, he contends, and
corporate subsidies reduce state gov-
ernments’ ability to fund public goods,
such as education and transportation.
But without those extra incentives,
firms with “market power” tend to raise
prices to pay for the inefficiencies of
their existing locations, say some
observers. Rolnick responds that
antitrust laws—not incentives—should
be used to prevent the inefficiencies of
“market power,” which he equates to
“monopolistic situations.” States should
not subsidize monopolies, but they
often do, he says. “The monopolies are
the ones who are the most successful
in using these subsidies.”
Big-league sports franchises are a
prime example, Rolnick says. “These
guys have a monopoly in a unique way
because they are a very special form of
entertainment, and they have played
the bidding wars to the hilt. Billions of
public dollars have gone to these
private companies because … they can
provide a very credible threat that ‘if
we go, you don’t get anybody.’”
Some economic development offi-
cials agree with Rolnick’s suggestion
that Congress should outlaw incentives.
“I would testify for that bill the minute
they write it,” says Aris Melissaratos,
Maryland’s secretary of Business and
Economic Development. “I really don’t
like this continuing bidding war,” he
explains. “Even though … in most cases
it’s a rational quantitative analysis of
payback, some jurisdictions at times
act irrationally and create a bidding war
that just gets out of hand.”
Which Bait Works Best?
In North Carolina, the debate over tax
credits for job creation intensified
when Michael Luger, a University of
North Carolina economist, published
a study questioning the effectiveness
of an economic incentive program
called the Lee Act. Luger estimated
that “only around 4 percent of the jobs
claimed to be created with Lee Act
incentives actually were induced.”
North Carolina granted $208 million
of tax credits under the program in the
years 1996 through 2001. Since then,
North Carolina has scaled back some
aspects of the Lee Act to free up funds
to use in more targeted incentive
programs, says Don Hobart, general
counsel for the state’s Department of
Commerce. Hobart says tax credits
under the Lee Act have been more
effective than Luger’s 4 percent figure
would indicate, but he concedes that “tax
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Virginia hooked a semiconductor manufacturer
in February 2002. Cerxon Microtechnologies LLC
was just a startup operation, but it seemed like a
pretty big fish in the small pond of Henry
County, where plant closings had pushed the
unemployment rate up to 13 percent.
Cerxon garnered several hundred thousand
dollars in state and local incentives because it
promised to invest $6.6 million and employ 250
people. Gov. Mark Warner hailed the Cerxon
deal as “a tremendous win for Henry County
and all of Southside Virginia.”
The company relocated to the county from
Camden, S.C., a city that apparently made no
attempt to retain Cerxon. In sharp contrast,
Virginia gave the company a $200,000 grant
from its Governor’s Opportunity Fund, a
$100,000 grant from its Tobacco Commission,
plus nearly $1 million in loans and other
incentives from Henry County.
“Oh my God!” exclaimed Daniel Young,
director of grants and incentives for the South
Carolina Department of Commerce, when he
learned about the incentives Virginia paid to
attract the company. “Camden was not real
upset when that project left,” he said. “To my
knowledge, we did not counteroffer because I
don’t think [Cerxon] was really big enough. ... I
believe it was a one- or two-person operation.”
In Virginia, Cerxon employed a few people,
but it never came close to generating 250 jobs
or investing $6.6 million. It went out of business
in December 2003.
While Virginia was luring Cerxon away from
South Carolina, the Palmetto State was wooing
CropTech away from the Old Dominion. CropTech
was a highly touted biotech company that
planned to use genetically altered tobacco to
manufacture pharmaceuticals. It grew up in
Virginia Tech’s Corporate Research Center, but it
shopped around for a new location as it geared
up for mass production.
Virginia made an effort to retain the company,
but its incentives paled in comparison to the
multimillion-dollar package that South Carolina
put together to attract CropTech to Berkeley
County. At a press conference in May 2002, the
chairman of the Charleston Regional Development
Alliance raved about CropTech’s potential. “The
company’s unique processes and creative
approaches will provide top-quality jobs for area
residents,” he said, “and its research will help
improve the lives of people around the world.”
Things didn’t pan out that way. Nearly one
year later—on April Fools’ Day—the headline in
The Post and Courier told Chapter 11 of the
CropTech story. “Berkeley may lose CropTech,” it







Sincentives represent a blunt instrument
for economic development from a state’s
perspective, whereas other programs are
a lot more surgical.”
The Tar Heel State has beefed up
its One North Carolina Fund, which
makes performance-based cash grants
for industrial recruitment. The fund
used to receive just $1 million or $2
million per year, but in 2001, the
General Assembly made a one-time
contribution of $15 million. And now
the Department of Commerce is
seeking another $20 million for the
fund from the 2004 General Assembly.
Last year, North Carolina also
established its Site Infrastructure
Development Fund, which makes cash
grants for site improvements to com-
panies that are relocating to or
expanding within the state. The fund
has received a one-time appropriation
of $24 million.
“Companies want money upfront
now,” says Daniel Young, director of
grants and incentives for South Car-
olina’s Department of Commerce.
“They’re all doing their 15-year models,
and the more you put in upfront, the
greater the impact. If you start spread-
ing it out on taxes and soft money, and
spreading that over years, you don’t get
the bang for the buck.”
Most of South Carolina’s hard-dollar
incentives are grants to localities for
infrastructure improvements. Young
refers to this deal-closing fund as the
“checking account.” Annual appropri-
ations to that account have been about
$18 million for the “past six or eight
years at least,” he says.
Virginia is trying to increase its
Governor’s Opportunity Fund from
$17.5 million in the current two-year
budget to $23 million for the coming
two years, says Mark Kilduff, executive
director of Virginia’s Economic Devel-
opment Partnership. That pot of
money attracts lots of attention, he
says, but the vast majority of the state’s
economic development deals do not
qualify for those funds.
A more common form of upfront
assistance in Virginia is work-force
training. “That program is meaningful
to 99 percent of the companies we
work with,” Kilduff says, because it
helps defray the costs of pre-employ-
ment training.
Maryland’s secretary of Business and
Economic Development also puts
work-force training at the top of his
list. “That is an incentive that I am very
much in favor of because it enhances
productivity of the worker and the
enterprise,” Melissaratos says. “It
makes that enterprise more competi-
tive, and the skill set is retained for the
worker in case something at that
company doesn’t pan out.”
Whether a state offers work-force
training or tax credits or performance
grants, it’s important to keep incentives
simple, says David Satterfield, execu-
tive director of West Virginia’s Eco-
nomic Development Office. In recent
years, West Virginia has boiled its
incentive programs down from 21 to
four, and Satterfield is determined to
make them “predictable, meaningful
and based on common sense.”
Prospects should not need an army of
tax lawyers to determine an incentive’s
true value, he says. “If they don’t under-
stand it, they won’t appreciate it.”
During most of the 1990s, Wash-
ington, D.C., refused to play the baiting
game, and schools of companies swam
across the Potomac River to Northern
Virginia. “Five or six years ago, the city
was really an economic desert,” says
Chris Bender, a spokesman for the
Office of the Deputy Mayor for Plan-
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Virginia officials put together a huge incentive pack-
age in the mid-1990s, when Motorola executives
were looking to build a $3 billion semiconductor
plant west of Richmond. In addition to offering $60
million for achieving production milestones, Virginia
officials accelerated plans to extend Route 288
through rural Goochland and Powhatan counties.
They also expedited $12 million to jumpstart a new
School of Engineering at Virginia Commonwealth
University. Until Motorola came around, neither of
those projects were high priorities for state funding.
Microelectronic engineering became a major
focus of the new school, and Motorola engineers
helped design the school’s electrical engineering
curriculum. Also, two community colleges in the
Richmond area established specialized microelec-
tronics technology programs to prepare
thousands of employees to work at Motorola.
The plant was delayed, but another semiconduc-
tor manufacturer, Infineon Technologies, built a
plant on the east side of the city.
VCU graduated its first class of engineering
students in 2000. By then, the $323 million
extension of Route 288 was under construction,
but the Motorola site was sitting idle, and the
community colleges were scaling back their
microelectronics programs.
In 2002, Motorola abandoned plans to build
its proposed plant.
Virginia never paid any production-milestone
incentives to Motorola, but the phantom plant
did have a big impact on the Richmond
economy. Some residents complain that the
project caused a misallocation of transportation
and education resources, while others say things
worked out for the best.
“I’ve always viewed Route 288 as a big
benefit of Motorola,” says Ray Owens, a senior
economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond. “It was the missing link of Richmond’s
circumferential beltway.”
Also, VCU’s School of Engineering helped
attract Infineon, which currently employs about
1,750 people, says Mark Kilduff, executive
director of the Virginia Economic Development
Partnership. The engineering school, he notes,
“still is a great benefit to Infineon,” and it has
helped attract other high-tech companies to the
Richmond region. —KR
The Big One That Got Away
Virginia’s big semiconductor catch turned out
to be Infineon Technologies. The company built































Dning and Economic Development.
“The businesses that were here were
categorically fleeing for more fertile
ground. There just was no support.”
The District became more business
friendly in the late 1990s, Bender says,
following the election of Mayor
Anthony Williams and the designation
of enterprise zones covering two-thirds
of the city. Since then, the District has
experienced an “economic renaissance,”
Bender says. “We were rated No. 1 in
foreign real estate investment in the
world in 2002. Our office vacancy rates
are the lowest in the country despite
the highest rents.”
Many law firms, associations, and
multinational corporations want a pres-
ence in Washington, D.C., but the city
still struggles to attract and retain an
adequate retail tax base. Bender says a
new shopping center in the low-income
Brentwood area is one of the District’s
top incentive success stories. With sig-
nificant assistance from the city, Rhode
Island Place has attracted the District’s
first Home Depot and a Giant Food,
the only grocery store in the Brent-
wood area.
Washington, D.C., is saddled with a
high percentage of federal property
that doesn’t generate any tax revenue,
Bender explains. So city officials have
to find creative ways to capitalize on
the remaining real estate. “We do that
by getting businesses here, and that
takes incentives,” he says. “We do need
incentives. There’s no question about
that.” (For more on Washington, D.C.’s
commercial real estate market, see the
cover story from the Fall 2003 issue of
Region Focus titled “Building in Uncle
Sam’s Backyard.”)
West Virginia’s economic develop-
ment officials take a similar view. The
Mountain State has upped its ante on
incentives since Gov. Bob Wise took
office in 2001. Most notably, West Vir-
ginia has raised $225 million for a new
economic development grant program.
“I look at [incentives] like my retire-
ment plan,” Satterfield says. “I’m
putting money away and investing it
hoping that there’s going to be a gain.”
People investing in West Virginia are
hoping to increase the value of their
companies in much the same way.
“They expect the state to bring some-
thing to the dance.”
No Fishing Allowed?
Rolnick, the economist at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, admits
that government officials have little
choice but to offer incentives. “Here in
the Twin Cities … if somebody comes
after 3M or General Mills or the Min-
nesota Twins … you, as a mayor or a
governor, have to respond.” But Con-
gress should end this baiting game by
taxing the value that private companies
receive from any preferential treat-
ment, he says. “The federal government
would tax that income at a confisca-
tory rate.”
In 1999, Minnesota Congressman
David Minge introduced the Distort-
ing Subsidies Limitation Act, which
would have placed a steep federal excise
tax on incentives—not the 100 percent
tax that Rolnick advocated, but a sub-
stantial tax nonetheless. The legislation
never received a full hearing, Rolnick
says. “The economics of it are pretty
clear,” he says. But “there are huge con-
flicts of interest here. In the current
system, politicians are allowed to give
away goodies, and if you end the bidding
wars, they can’t give away goodies.”
At the Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond, Owens is not quite that
cynical. “If the world were a perfectly
competitive place, incentive programs
would be silly,” he agrees. “But these
programs are designed by people exist-
ing in the real world—not the perfect
world of principles [of economics]
textbooks.”
It would be impossible to equalize
what every state has to offer, adds
Kilduff at the Virginia Economic
Development Partnership. “Would
every state and every locality have to
have the same tax rates?” he asks.
“Would every community have to have
an interstate? Would every community
have to have a university?”
To evaluate a particular proposal to
eliminate incentives, you would have
to look at how incentives are defined,
says Hobart at the North Carolina
Department of Commerce. “Is it truly
preferential treatment? Or is just smart
public policy?”
Hobart suggests that most wealthy
states would gladly quit the baiting
game while they are ahead. “Any state
that already has a great quality of life
and a solid, well-developed infrastruc-
ture for transportation and education
would have no problem eliminating
pure economic development incentive
dollars from all states,” he predicts.
Not necessarily, says Kilduff. He
asks: How would the United States
stop foreign governments from baiting
their hooks with incentives?
Rolnick says international trade
agreements should include subsidy
restrictions. “It is the federal govern-
ment’s responsibility to negotiate good
trade agreements,” he says. “Just as we
don’t want trade barriers, we don’t want
subsidy wars.” And besides, “most of
the subsidy wars are internal,” he con-
tends. “Minneapolis and St. Paul go
after each other’s companies, and from
the state’s point of view, that’s crazy.”
That logic also applies to neighbor-
ing states, says Maryland’s Melissaratos.
“This is a pretty small planet, and I
hate to see us fighting for jobs with Vir-
ginia. We need to face the global com-
petition together.” RF
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